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BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME AND
PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME: A
COMPARISON OF THEIR POSSIBLE USE
AS DEFENSES TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The imposition of criminal liability is premised upon the pros-
ecution establishing that a defendant acted voluntarily,' and pos-
sessed the requisite criminal intent.2 Thus, individuals whose crim-
inal acts are not manifestations of free will because of mental
incompetence, or whose actions are justified because of extraordi-
' See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 & n.4 (1952) (citing Pound, Intro-
duction, in F. SAYRE, A SELECTION OF CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (1927)); Ex parte Trombley,
31 Cal. 2d 801, 807-08, 193 P.2d 734, 739 (1948); People v. Grant, 71 III. 2d 551, 558-59, 377
N.E.2d 4, 8 (1978). Because of the requirement of voluntariness, courts have held that there
can be no criminal responsibility for acts committed while unconscious, see, e.g., Corder v.
Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 77, 79 (Ky. 1955), or while involuntarily intoxicated, see, e.g.,
People v. Carlo, 46 App. Div. 2d 764, 764, 361 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170 (1st Dep't 1974). The
defense of "automatism" was developed at common law to address criminal conduct result-
ing from "involuntary act[s] performed in a state of unconsciousness not amounting to in-
sanity." N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, STUDIES IN CRIMINAL LAW 62 (1964). Acts resulting from a
concussion, epilepsy, hypnotism, and sleepwalking have been included within the scope of
the defense of automatism. Brady, Strict Liability Offenses: A Justification, 8 CRIM. L.
BULL. 217, 218 n.7 (1972). Such conditions are expressly excluded from being voluntary
under the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (2), reprinted in 10 U.LA 464
(1968). Similarly, the defense of justification, defenses based on insanity, intoxication or
delusions, and defenses of duress or self-defense all excuse criminal liability based on the
absence of a voluntary act. See Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 220-26 (1982).
Even strict criminal liability statutes require that the sanctionable conduct be done
voluntarily. See Brady, supra, at 217-18; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (1), reprinted
in 10 U.LA 464 (1968) (minimal requirement for criminal liability is person's performance
of voluntary act or omission of act of which he is physically capable).
2 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951); Rent v. United States, 209 F.2d
893, 900 (5th Cir. 1954); Tift v. State, 133 Ga. App. 455, 456-57, 211 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1974);
Dowden v. State, 638 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). Mens rea, or criminal intent, is
not a constitutional prerequisite to criminal liability. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535
(1968).
Thus, many states have imposed strict criminal liability for certain acts. Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 63-67 (1933). Strict liability occurs when conduct is
made punishable without requiring the defendant to have acted with any particular mental
state. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 31, at 218 (1972); Note, Liabil-
ity Without Fault: Logic and Potential of a Developing Concept, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 1201,
1201-02.
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nary circumstances, are shielded from criminal liability.3 The gra-
dation of offenses incorporated into criminal codes ensures that
criminal punishment is properly correlated to the relative intent of
the accused, and the operative circumstances of the crime.4 The
concepts of criminal liability, firmly rooted in English common
law,5 were developed by male judges and legislators 6 largely for
3 See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (no
responsibility if actor lacks substantial capacity to appreciate wrongfulness of conduct);
Fare v. Ramon M., 22 Cal. 3d 419, 424, 584 P.2d 524, 527, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390 (1978) (en
banc) (defendant must be of sound mind to be criminally responsible); People v. Rock-
amann, 79 IM. App. 3d 575, 582, 399 N.E.2d 162, 167 (1979) (insane person not responsible
for criminal acts); see W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 2, §§ 47-57, at 356-413. Defendants
may plead insanity as a total bar to prosecution, see Bumgarner v. Lockhart, 361 F. Supp.
829, 833 (E.D. Ark. 1973), or as a basis for mitigating sentencing or punishment, see Saddler
v. United States, 531 F.2d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1976).
Punishment is generally aimed at either retribution, deterrence, reform, or some combi-
nation thereof. See C. MERCIER, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBmrrY 34 (1981). Since mentally incom-
petent individuals are unable to control the actions that inflicted harm upon their victims,
punishment designed to provide retribution is inappropriate. See A. KENNY, FREEWILL AND
REsPoNsIBIrrY 72 (1978). Nor would punishment aimed at deterrence be appropriate when
imposed against a person incapable of controlling her behavior. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE IN-
SANITY DEFENSE 13 (1967).
Among the traditional defenses that may excuse criminal liability because of extraordi-
nary circumstances are duress, see, e.g., Nail v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 702, 271 S.W.
1059, 1059 (1925), self-defense, see, e.g., People v. Toledo, 85 Cal. App. 2d 577, 580, 193 P.2d
953, 955 (1946), and defense of property, see, e.g., State v. Couch, 52 N.M. 127, 137-38, 193
P.2d 405, 411 (1948).
" See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.100 -11.41.130 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3 to -
5 (West 1982); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1-210.4, reprinted in 10 U.LA 532-34 (1968);
see Keedy, History of the Pennsylvania Statute Creating Degrees of Murder, 97 U. PA. L.
REv. 759, 766-73 (1949). In the United States, the gradation of crimes was first instituted in
response to a general movement for reform of the penal law and moderation of punishment.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Act of 1794, 1794 Pa. Laws, ch. 257, §§ 1-2; see Keedy, supra, at 764-
73. The purpose of the reform was to mitigate the harshness of the death penalty and re-
serve it only for the most serious crimes. See Danforth, The Model Penal Code and Degrees
of Criminal Homicide, 11 AM. U.L. REv. 147, 149 (1962). Under the Model Penal Code, for
example, criminal homicide can be labelled murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide,
based upon the degree of culpability involved. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1-210.4, re-
printed in 10 ULA 532-34 (1968); Danforth, supra, at 147.
1 See Patterson v. Winn, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233, 241 (1831); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra
note 2, § 9, at 58-59; 1 E. McCLAIN, TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 2 (1974). Generally, the
English common law that existed at the time of the founding of the American colonies re-
mains the law of each state unless expressly or impliedly repealed by statute. See, e.g., Asso-
ciated Students of Univ. of Ariz. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 120 Ariz. 100, 103, 584 P.2d 564,
567 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); People v. Rehman, 253 Cal. App. 2d 119, 150,
61 Cal. Rptr. 65, 85 (1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 947 (1968).
6 See 2 W. ALEXANDER, THE HISTORY OF WOMEN 318-20 (1976); A. JONES, WOMEN WHO
KILL 311 (1980). In 18th century England, women were "excused" from serving in all public
offices because of their "weakness" and man's effort "to preserve the modesty of their sex."
See 2 W. ALEXANDER, supra, at 320.
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male defendants. 7 Even today, only a small fraction of criminal de-.
fendants are women,8 and relatively few violent crimes are commit-
ted by women.9 Thus, female criminal defendants charged with vi-
olent crimes are an aberration to the criminal justice system,10 and
must depend upon the same legal defenses that traditionally have
been applied to men.1
Battered woman's syndrome12 and premenstrual syndrome
7 See A. JONES, supra note 6, at 4. In every country during all periods of history, men
have committed far more crimes than women. Id.; see S. DATESMAN & F. ScARPrrr , WOMEN,
CRIME & JUSTICE 4-8 (1980).
" See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 176, 186 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as 1983 REPORTS]. According to the FBI's 1983 REPORTS, women ac-
counted for approximately 13% of those arrested for murder and manslaughter, and 29.5%
of those arrested for larceny and theft in 1983. Id. at 186. Of the 29 categories of crimes
listed in the FBI report, women comprised the majority of those arrested in only two catego-
ries - runaways (58%), and prostitution and commercialized vice (70%). Id. Overall, 83.4%
of those arrested for the indexed crimes in 1983 were male. Id.
See id. at 186. Although the percentage of females arrested has risen steadily from
11.4% in 1963, to 12.9% in 1968, to 15.3% in 1973, to 15.8% in 1978, and to 16.6% in 1983,
see UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 109 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as 1963 REPORTS]; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 118
(1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 REPORTS]; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 131 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 REPORTS]; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 197 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 REPORTS]; 1983
REPORTS, supra note 8, at 186, the percentage of females arrested for violent crimes has
remained at about 10% for the last 10 years. Compare 1983 REPORTS, supra note 8, at 186
(10.8%), with 1973 REPORTS, supra, at 131 (10.2%).
"0 See A. JoNEs, supra note 6, at 311; supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text; see
also Rasche, The Female Offender as an Object of Criminological Research, in A. BRODSKY,
THE FEMALE OFFENDER 10-11 (1975) (far smaller numbers of women than men are arrested
or incarcerated, and, thus, are often overlooked by system). The small percentage of female
criminals frequently is omitted from statistical surveys because of the insignificant size of
the figure. See Rasche, supra, at 11. This omission often results in women being denied
access to rehabilitative or experimental programs. Id. Moreover, new programs often are
designed exclusively for males and only extended to women when possible. Id.
1 Cf. supra notes 6 & 7 and accompanying text (criminal justice system developed to
deal with male defendants).
11 Battered woman's syndrome is a psychological theory that identifies the common
characteristics of women in abusive relationships and explains why women subjected to re-
current beatings are psychologically unable to terminate these relationships. Note, The Ad-
missibility of Expert Testimony on the Battered Woman Syndrome in Support of a Claim
of Self-Defense, 15 CONN. L. REv. 121, 121 n.1 (1982). The constant battering results in
feelings of guilt, helplessness, and low self-esteem, making the victim passive and unable to
help herself. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 31 (1979); Hilberman & Munson, Sixty
Battered Women, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 460, 464-65 (1977-1978). These psychological effects, com-
pounded by external social and economic factors, cause the battered woman to remain with
her abusive mate despite the obvious danger. See L. WALKER, supra, at 128. Commentators
have suggested using evidence of the syndrome to prove the reasonableness of the battered
woman's actions when she strikes back at her abuser. See, e.g., Eber, The Battered Wife's
Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 927-28 (1981); Schneider, Equal
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(PMS),'3 two psycho-medical theories peculiar to women, occasion-
ally have been asserted as defenses to criminal liability, but have
met with varying degrees of success.' 4 While battered woman's
syndrome has been asserted successfully on occasion, 5 the use of
PMS as a defense, although yet untried in the American courts,'
has drawn substantial criticism.' 7
This Note will examine the use of battered woman's syndrome
Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
623, 634-35 (1980). But see Comment, Jury Instructions Given on Subjective Standard of
Reasonableness in Self-Defense Do Not Require a Specific Instruction on Battered Woman
Syndrome, 60 N.D.L. REV. 141, 151 (1984) (subjective self-defense standard sufficient to ac-
count for battered women).
'3 Premenstrual syndrome (PMS), sometimes referred to as "premenstrual tension" or
"premenstrual tension syndrome," Perr, Medical, Psychiatric & Legal Aspects of Premen-
strual Tension, 115 A. J. PsYcHUATRY 211, 211 (1958), is a condition marked by a wide
variety of physical and psychological ailments that recur regularly at the same phase of the
menstrual cycle. Wallach & Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome & Criminal Responsibil-
ity, 19 UCLA L. REv. 209, 212-13 (1971). The symptoms include tension, anxiety depression,
and various physical maladies such as headaches and breast tenderness. Sanders, Warner,
Backstrom & Bancroft, Mood Sexuality, Hormones and the Menstrual Cycle, 45 PsycHoso-
MATIC MED. 487, 487 (1983); Wallach & Rubin, supra, at 212-13. PMS symptoms usually
disappear with the onset of menstrual flow and do not begin again until the second half of
the menstrual cycle. See Muse, Cetel, Futterman, & Yen, The Premenstrual Syndrome, 311
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1345, 1345 (1984); Reid & Yen, Premenstrual Syndrome, 139 AM. J. OB-
sT'riRcs & GYNECOLOGY 85, 86 (1981). It has been argued that the severe effects of the
syndrome should negate or mitigate the criminal responsibility of those who suffer from it.
See Wallach & Rubin, supra, at 233.
" See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-522, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981)
(expert testimony of battered woman's syndrome held inadmissible on issue of self-defense
in murder trial); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981) (exclusion of evidence of
battered woman's syndrome was proper in murder trial); Bird, Defense Linked to Menstru-
ation Dropped in Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1982, at B4, col. 4 (criminal defendant pleads
guilty to a lesser charge after asserting PMS as a defense).
15 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202, 212, 478 A.2d 364, 376, 381 (1984) (exclu-
sion of battered woman's syndrome testimony required reversal and remand for new trial);
State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984) (en banc) (expert's testi-
mony on battered woman's syndrome held admissible). Nine of the 14 jurisdictions that
have been presented with evidence on the battered woman's syndrome in criminal cases
have allowed the testimony. See infra note 68.
" See Note, Premenstrual Syndrome, 6 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 219, 223 (1983). Defenses
based on PMS have been asserted successfully in Britain, see id. at 219, and Canada, see
infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Bird, supra note 14, at B4, col. 4; Brozan, Premenstrual Syndrome: A Com-
plex Issue, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1982, at C16, col. 2. Brooklyn District Attorney Elizabeth
Holtzman, commenting on a case in which the PMS issue was raised, argued that while
certain symptoms may accompany the menstrual cycle, they were not enough to support a
legal defense. See Bird, supra note 14, at B4, col. 4. Other critics have voiced fears that any
use of PMS as a defense could deter women's advancement in society. See Brozan, supra, at
C16, col. 5; infra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
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and PMS as bases for defenses to criminal behavior. Previous ap-
plications or attempted applications of battered woman's syn-
drome and PMS as defenses will be considered and the reluctance
of the judiciary to accept these theories will be investigated. The
legal effect, scientific acceptance, and social and policy considera-
tions behind the theories - all factors relevant to their admissibil-
ity as evidence - will be discussed. The Note will suggest permit-
ting the use of both theories to the extent required by traditional
justice and substantial fairness.
I. A DESCRIPTION OF THE THEORIES OF BATTERED WOMAN'S
SYNDROME AND PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME
Because sociologists find it difficult to determine the number
of women that are physically abused by their husbands or male
companions, varying estimates have been set forth.18 Although
abusive spouses have been subject to criminal liability for many
years,19 only recently have sociologists and attorneys begun to
study the scope and ramifications of the abuse itself.20 "Battered
'8 See, e.g., R. GELLES, THE VIOLENr HoME 47 (1972); D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 10-
13 (1976). Either isolated or repeated instances of physical violence between spouses were
found in more than one-half of the eighty families studied by Gelles. See R. GELLES, supra,
at 48. Moreover, in 26% of the violent homes studied, incidents of recurrent assaults were
noted. See id. Commentators have predicted that one-third to one-half of all women living
with male companions will experience some form of abuse, whether in the form of threats or
physical beatings. See Russell, Introduction in, L. WALKER, supra note 12, at ix; Schneider,
supra note 12, at 624-25.
1G See D. MARTIN, supra note 18, at 31. Blackstone wrote that since a husband must
answer for his wife at law, it was reasonable to entrust him with the power of restraining her
by domestic chastisement. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMmE'ARIEs 432 (R. Welsh & Co. ed.
1897). During the reign of Charles the Second, wives were given the right of "security of the
peace" against their husbands, but husbands were still permitted to restrain their wives
liberty in instances of "gross misbehavior." Id. at 433. American courts initially adopted the
common law rule allowing husbands to impose physical discipline on their wives. See, e.g.,
Bradley v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 73, 73 (1824) (husband may give wife "moderate correc-
tion" because he is answerable for her misbehavior), overruled, Harris v. State, 71 Miss. 462,
14 So. 266 (1894). By the late 19th century, however, most United States jurisdictions had
made wife-beating illegal. See D. MARTIN, supra note 18, at 31. Although stressing that hus-
bands did not have an absolute right to beat their wives, later decisions required a showing
of malice or permanent injury before imposing sanctions on the husband. See, e.g., State v.
Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874) (usually it is better "to draw the curtain, shut out the public
gaze, and leave the parties to forget and forgive").
20 See, e.g., M. Roy, THE ABUsIVE PARTNER (1982) (considered various factors precipi-
tating violence in 4,000 cases of spousal abuse in New York City area); S. ST=INmEz, THE
CYCLE OF VIOLENCE (1977) (57 families studied to determine reaction to and solution of con-
flicts); Gayford, Wife Battering: A Preliminary Survey of 100 Cases, 1975 1 BR. MED. J. 194
(100 women who received severe and repeated injuries from their husbands were studied to
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woman's syndrome" is the name given to the characteristics that
abused women display and to the effects that regular beatings have
on them.21 The typical battering relationship consists of a three-
stage cycle: first, a tension-building stage; second, a violent stage;
and third, a contrite, loving stage.22 The cyclical nature of the rela-
tionship allows the battered woman to anticipate oncoming vio-
lence,23 and entices her to remain with her abuser after the violent
stage is over. 4
determine similarity of background and effects of violence); Rounsaville, Theories in Mari-
tal Violence: Evidence from a Study of Battered Women, 3 VICMOLOGY 11 (1978) (consid-
ered various theories of marital violence as applied to 31 victims of battering); Yllo, Sexual
Equality and Violence Against Wives in American States, 14 J. Comp. FAM STUD. 67 (1983)
(studied relation between legal sexual equality and incidence of wife-beating in United
States). The focus of this research has only recently begun to shift from "family" violence to
the battered woman. See, e.g., D. MARTIN, supra note 18, at 1-8, 72-85.
21 See supra note 12.
22 L. WALKER, supra note 12, at 55; Eber, supra note 12, at 927; Note, supra note 12, at
130. During the tension-building stage of the battering relationship, minor abuse often oc-
curs and the woman may try to make peace with her husband; she may even blame herself
for her husband's conduct. Eber, supra note 12, at 927. Acute battering occurs in the violent
stage during which the woman feels powerless to stop her husband's actions. Id. When the
violent stage is over, the husband generally is contrite and loving, thus causing the woman
to feel a sense of relief and to forgive her assailant. Id.
23 See L. WALKER, supra note 12, at 57; Note, supra note 12, at 130 n.47. During the
tension-building stage of the battering relationship, the abusive husband maintains some
control over his violent tendencies and the woman may try to placate or avoid her husband.
L. WALKER, supra note 12, at 56-57. Women who have been beaten regularly in the past
learn to estimate when the violence eventually will escalate, and will try to postpone the
escalation through exceptionally passive behavior. Id. at 57. The tension-building stage may
continue for a long period of time, and only be escalated into severe battering because of
external circumstances, such as the husband experiencing a work-related problem. Id. at 58.
Most women treat the initial battering incident as an isolated occurrence and do not
expect further abuse. J. GnELs-Suis, WIFE BATTERING: A SYsTEMs THEORY APPROACH 59
(1983). After a second or more significant battering incident, however, most women realize
that the violence is part of a pattern which will continue. Id.
24 See L. WALKER, supra note 12, at 65-70. The psychological impact of the abuse re-
sults in the battered woman feeling incapable of leaving her husband and functioning on her
own. Hilberman, Overview: The "Wife Beater's Wife" Reconsidered, 137 An J. PSYCHIATRY
1336, 1341-42 (1980); Note, supra note 12, at 131. Additionally, once the husband returns to
the loving, contrite stage of the cycle, the battered woman tries to convince herself that the
violence will end and be replaced by a normal relationship. L WALKER, supra note 12, at 67.
Therefore, even though they have the strength and courage to leave their husbands, many
women are enticed to stay because of their spouse's behavior during the loving, contrite
phase. See id. at 68. Finally, flight is not always an adequate solution because the abusive
husband may follow his wife, and continue to threaten and abuse her. Eber, supra note 12,
at 929.
Many wives will rationalize their husband's behavior by trying to convince themselves
that they deserved to be struck or that it was for their own good. See R. GELLE S, supra note
18, at 59. One battered woman studied by Gelles considered her nagging to be the cause of
1985]
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Battered women typically live in a constant state of fear, and
have a very diminished sense of self-worth.25 Frequent and recur-
rent beatings create a state of "learned helplessness," characterized
by extreme passivity and submissiveness." Generally, the battered
woman is reluctant to report the battering, because she and her
children are economically dependent upon her abusive husband, 7
and because she fears that the police and the courts will fail to
provide her with adequate protection. 28 As a result, a feeling of iso-
lation develops, which further reinforces the sense of helpless-
ness.29 Eventually, frustration and lack of recourse may leave the
battered women with only two alternatives-to submit to further
her husband's attacks. Id. at 158. Studies have shown, however, that a variety of factors
unrelated to the wife's behavior may lead to marital violence. See, e.g., id. at 30, 145-47
(high degree of violence during wife's pregnancy); Corenblum, Reactions to Alcohol-Related
Marital Violence, 44 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 665, 672 (1983) (linking alcohol use to violence);
Gayford, supra note 20, at 196 (finding correlation between family violence during child-
hood and later marital violence). Thus, the battered woman's syndrome demonstrates that
the abused spouse neither deserves nor enjoys the violence. See L. WALKER, supra note 12,
at 20, 29.
25 See Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea and Battered Women, 14 TRIAL
34, 36-41 (July 1978); Comment, The Battered Spouse Syndrome as a Defense to a Homi-
cide Charge Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 26 VILL. L. REV. 105, 110-12 (1980-1981).
28 Note, supra note 12, at 121 n.1. After living with her abuser for some time, the bat-
tered woman realizes that the abuse may occur at any time, and feels powerless to prevent
the violence. See Eisenberg & Seymour, supra note 25, at 36, 41. Thus, the battered woman
loses all motivation to avoid the beatings, and perceives herself as incapable of performing
even the simplest of tasks. Note, supra note 12, at 121 n.1; see Hilberman, supra note 24, at
1341-42.
27 See L. WALKER, supra note 12, at 129-30; Steinmetz, Wife Beating: A Critique and
Reformulation of Existing Theory, 6 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 322, 328-29 (1978).
Women who have been receiving government subsidies may be willing to leave a battering
relationship because they know they will continue to receive support from the state. L
WALKER, supra note 12, at 127-28. The middle class or wealthy woman, however, may feel
trapped in the relationship due to a fear of becoming poor. Id. at 128-29.
28 See, e.g., Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP.
7, 9-11 (1978); Hilberman, supra note 24, at 1338. The criminal justice system has been
accused of ignoring the plight of the battered woman by failing to protect her. See Eber,
supra note 12, at 929; Hilberman supra note 24, at 1338. Typically, the battered wife will
have called the police on several occasions, but these calls rarely result in an arrest. Eber,
supra note 12, at 929. Even if the battered wife can convince the police to arrest her hus-
band, she may often be pressured to drop the charges. Id. If the case goes to trial, the
husband will usually receive a light sentence, and a temporary restraining order directing
him not to see the wife will be issued. Id. Such orders generally fail to provide the battered
wife with adequate protection. Id.
29 See Comment, supra note 25, at 111. The combination of fear, isolation, helplessness,
and guilt leaves the battered woman in a state of total emotional dependency on her hus-
band. See id. at 111-12.
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beating and pain with the possibility of resultant death,30 or to
strike back and thus risk criminal liability themselves. 31
PMS is a disorder affecting some women during the period im-
mediately prior to menstruation.32 The disorder is characterized by
a striking variety of behavioral and emotional symptoms, including
headaches, nausea, lethargy, depression, mood swings, and clumsi-
ness. 33 The symptoms of PMS are so varied, some scientists have
30 L. WALYCER, supra note 12, at 75; Eber, supra note 12, at 928. One study indicates
that 41% of all female murder victims are killed by their husbands. Schneider, supra note
12, at 626.
31 See Note, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Potential Defense to a Homicide Charge,
6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 213, 219 (1978). Data indicates that the victims of female murderers
are generally men with whom they have had relationships, and that these killings are often
either in self-defense or precipitated by the victim. Schneider, supra note 12, at 624 n.3; see
D. MARTIN, supra note 18, at 14.
32 See Perr, supra note 13, at 211. Researchers disagree over the length of time that
should be identified as the premenstrual phase. See, e.g., A. BECK, CHRONOLOGICAL FLUCTUA-
TIONS OF SIX PREMENSTRUAL TENSION VARIABLES AND THEIR RELATION TO TRADITIONAL-MOD-
ERN SEX ROLE STEREOTYPES 17 (1970) (three to four days); J. DELANEY, M. LUPTON & E.
TOTH, THE CuRse. A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MENSTRUATION 73 (1976) (two or three days);
Perr, supra note 13, at 211 (one to two weeks). Two researchers have asserted that PMS is a
"cyclical syndrome" with regular symptoms that can occur at any time. See Sutherland &
Stewart, A Critical Analysis of the Premenstrual Syndrome, 1965 LANCET 1180, 1183.
In studying and defining PMS, a distinction must be made between the symptoms that
occur shortly before menstruation and the physical and emotional disturbances that occur
throughout the entire menstrual cycle. See A. BECK, supra, at 22-23. If a woman suffers
from the same symptoms throughout her monthly cycle, it is unlikely that they are linked to
the particular physiological changes occurring during the premenstruum, see id. at 22, and
her problems, therefore, may be linked to some other disorder, see id.
33 Perr, supra note 13, at 212; The Premenstrual Enigma, 9 HARV. MED. ScH. LETTER
1, 1 (August 1984) [hereinafter cited as Premenstrual Enigma]. PMS sufferers also com-
plain of fatigue, bloating, breast swelling and tenderness, junk-food binges, constipation,
insomnia, joint pain, and thirst. Perr, supra note 13, at 211-12; Premenstrual Enigma,
supra, at 1. Approximately 60%-70% of sufferers experience irritability-the most fre-
quently mentioned PMS symptom. A. BECK, supra note 32, at 18. About 50%-60% of those
afflicted suffer from depression, and 40%-50% experience tension, headaches, and pelvic
discomfort. Id. Virtually all the symptoms temporarily disrupt the woman's interpersonal
relationships and job effectiveness. Reid & Yen, supra note 13, at 96-97.
The myriad of seemingly unrelated symptoms displayed by PMS sufferers have led
some researchers to look for an underlying psychogenic disorder. Reid & Yen, supra note 13,
at 89. These researchers allege that the physical and psychological symptoms associated
with PMS are a result of a disturbed attitude toward sex and sexuality. See, e.g., 1 H.
DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 173-74 (1944-1945) (premenstrual depression reflects
pre-pubescent fear that something terrible is about to occur); Daly, The Role of Menstrua-
tion in Human Phylogenesis and Ontogenesis, 24 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSiS 151, 167-68
(1943) (premenstrual anxiety is linked to woman's frustrated sexual desires toward her fa-
ther); Silbermann, A Contribution to the Psychology of Menstruation, 31 INT'L J. PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 258, 261 (1950) (hormonal upheaval in menstrual cycle depends on woman's sexual
development). Additionally, researchers have reported that a wide variety of emotional and
behavioral disturbances accompany the premenstrual period. See, e.g., Dennerstein & Bur-
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estimated that between 70% and 90% of all women experience
some symptoms of the syndrome. 4 Despite the diversity of PMS
symptoms and the large number of women who suffer from them,
scientists have distinguished ordinary premenstrual discomfort, ex-
perienced by most menstruating women, from PMS.3 5 Although
PMS and premenstrual discomfort are characterized by many of
the same symptoms, only PMS sufferers experience the physical,
psychological, and behavioral symptoms to such a severe degree
that their ability to function normally is disrupted.3 6 While re-
searchers have linked PMS to hormonal changes occurring
throughout the menstrual cycle,3 7 great uncertainty remains re-
rows, Affect and the Menstrual Cycle, 1979-1980 J. OF AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 77, 84; Moos,
Typology of Menstrual Cycle Symptoms, 103 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 390, 393
(1969); Sanders, Warner, Backstrom & Bancroft, supra note 13, at 498. The syndrome has
been identified as a possible contributing factor in almost every kind of aberrant social be-
havior and psychological phenomena. Notman, The Psychiatrist's Approach, in PREMEN-
STRUAL TENSION: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 58 (C. Debrovner ed. 1982); Dalton, Men-
struation and Accidents, 1960 (2) BRIT. MED. J. 1425, 1426 (women accident prone during
premenstrual period); Dalton, Menstruation and Acute Psychiatric Illnesses, 1959 (1) BRIT.
MED. J. 148, 149 (menstruation relates to onset of acute psychiatric episodes).
Despite the apparent plethora of symptoms and scientific observations, most research-
ers define PMS to include both physical and psychological symptoms. See, e.g., Stewart,
Psychotic Aspects of Premenstrual Tension, 6 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 410, 410 (1957) (physical
and emotional disturbances are connected with menstrual cycle); Premenstrual Enigma,
supra, at 1 (some symptoms are physical, others emotional); Note, Premenstrual Stress
Syndrome as a Defense in Criminal Matters, 1983 DUKE L.J. 176, 176 (physical and psycho-
logical symptoms of PMS can range in severity).
-" See Perr, supra note 13, at 211; see also Premenstrual Enigma, supra note 33, at 1
(Harvard Medical School experts estimate that PMS affects 40% of women to some degree);
Note, supra note 16, at 220-21 (25% to 100% of women of childbearing age suffer PMS
symptoms).
35 Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 212-13.
3' Id. at 213 n.12. Recent surveys indicate that between five and six million women
experience premenstrual symptoms to a degree severe enough to disrupt their everyday rou-
tines. See Premenstrual Enigma, supra note 33, at 1. Based on questionnaire data, 20%-
40% of women report some degree of temporary mental or physical incapacitation during
the premenstrual stage. Reid & Yen, supra note 13, at 86.
11 See Muse, Cetel, Futterman & Yen, supra note 13, at 1348; Premenstrual Enigma,
supra note 33, at 2. The menstrual cycle is regulated by several different hormones, released
in varying amounts throughout the cycle. See A. BECK, supra note 32, at 2; Premenstrual
Enigma, supra note 33, at 2. The most widely accepted hypothesis for the cause of PMS
appears to be an improper balance of these hormones during the premenstrual phase. See A.
BECK, supra note 32, at 3-9; Premenstrual Enigma, supra note 33, at 2. A recent study has
demonstrated that PMS symptoms are greatly diminished by eliminating the cyclical varia-
tions in hormonal levels. See Muse, Cetel, Futterman & Yen, supra note 13, at 1348.
Some researchers have theorized that PMS is caused by premenstrual water retention,
see A. BECK, supra note 32, at 11-12, sodium retention, see Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13,
at 221, vitamin deficiency, see Reid & Yen, supra note 13, at 87-88, or psychogenic disor-
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garding the cause of the syndrome and why the symptoms vary so
greatly.38 Thus, there has been little success in treating and
preventing PMS.3 9
Among the behavioral disorders related to PMS is an in-
creased propensity to commit crimes during the premenstrual
phase.40 PMS may not actually cause increased criminal behavior,
however, the adverse physical effects of PMS, such as slower reac-
ders, see supra note 33.
-1 See Reid & Yen, supra note 13, at 97; Rubinow & Roy-Byrne, Premenstrual Syn-
dromes: Overview from a Methodological Perspective, 141 MED. J. PSYCHIATRY 163, 163
(1984); Premenstrual Enigma, supra note 33, at 1. It is very difficult to determine the
causes of PMS and to decide on a course of treatment because of the disparate collection of
symptoms that affect sufferers. Premenstrual Enigma, supra note 33, at 1. Proper research
requires many subjects to compensate for the individual traits of specific sufferers, and each
woman studied must be examined from cycle to cycle. Id.
" See Muse, Cetel, Futterman & Yen, supra note 13, at 1345; Premenstrual Enigma,
supra note 33, at 2, 5. The most popular medical treatments of PMS are based on the
premise that PMS is caused by hormonal fluctuations. Muse, Cetel, Futterman & Yen,
supra note 13, at 1345; Premenstrual Enigma, supra note 33, at 2. The hormonal-suppres-
sion treatment designed by Muse, Cetel, Futterman, and Yen, perhaps the most successful
to date, is not, however, recommended for long-term use. See Muse, Cetel, Futterman, &
Yen, supra note 13, at 1348. Suppression of prolactin, a hormone affecting the fluid balance
of the body, also has proven to be partially effective. See Benedek-Jaszmann & Hearn-
Sturtevant, Premenstrual Tension and Functional Infertility, 1 LANCET 1095, 1097 (1976).
Drugs which have been successful in alleviating dysmenorrhea, or painful menstruation,
have not been equally effective against PMS. Premenstrual Enigma, supra note 33, at 2.
Popular "home remedies" include exercise, stress management techniques, and various di-
ets. Id. In addition, psychotherapy may be helpful for some women. Id.
40 See Dalton, Menstruation & Crime, 2 Bn. MED. J. 1752, 1752 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Menstruation and Crime]. Dr. Katharina Dalton, one of the leading researchers in
the field of PMS, has been studying the disorder since 1953. Note, supra note 16, at 220 n.6.
In connection with a study on menstruation and crime, Dalton, over a period of six months,
interviewed 386 newly convicted female inmates at a British prison. Menstruation and
Crime, supra, at 1752. Dr. Dalton found that 49% of the crimes committed by regularly
menstruating women were committed in the four-day period prior to menstruation or during
the four days following the onset of menstruation. Id. The probability of such a distribution
occurring by chance was less than one in a thousand. Id.
Dr. Dalton found that PMS affected 27% of the prisoners who committed crimes dur-
ing the eight-day period before and during menstruation. Id. at 1752-53. In addition, 63% of
the PMS sufferers committed their crimes while suffering from various symptoms. Id. at
1753. Dalton concluded that these results showed a "highly significant relationship" be-
tween menstruation and crime. Id. In further studies, Dalton found a correlation between
criminal activity and menstruation even among women who suffered none of the physical
symptoms of PMS. See Dalton, Cyclical Criminal Acts in Premenstrual Syndrome, 2 LAN-
cET 1070, 1071 (1980). One woman studied was reported to have thrown a knife at one man,
escaped from confinement, made a false emergency call and assaulted three police officers,
all on the day before she began menstruating. Id. A similar study of inmates in a New York
State prison conducted in 1953 found that 62% of all violent crimes were committed in the
premenstrual week. Stewart, supra note 33, at 414.
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tions and increased clumsiness, may increase the likelihood that
female criminals may be caught.41 Alternatively, the mental and
emotional disturbances associated with PMS, which may interfere
with a woman's ability to behave rationally, may result in the in-
creased propensity toward criminal behavior.42 Regardless of
whether the mental disorders related to PMS are pre-existing con-
ditions aggravated by hormonal changes occurring prior to men-
struation,43 or are directly linked to the physiological aspects of
PMS, 44 many sufferers are so affected by PMS that they commit
criminal acts that they otherwise would not commit during other
points in their menstrual cycle.45
II. PAST AND RECENT LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF BOTH THEORIES
Battered woman's syndrome and PMS are very different
psycho-medical theories, however, each involves important legal
ramifications-the treatment of battered women by the criminal
justice system46 and, the mental competence of PMS sufferers in
relation to criminal culpability.47 Even before research identified
See Menstruation & Crime, supra note 40, at 1753.
42 See id. The irritability, lethargy, and depression accompanying PMS may be directly
responsible for certain criminal acts. Id. Irritability and loss of temper may result in violent
behavior and assault; lethargy may result in child neglect; and depression may cause suicide.
See id.
42 See Perr, supra note 13, at 216. PMS is based on physiological stress which may
upset the equilibrium and result in various unpleasant bodily feelings. Id. at 216. Any pre-
existing psychological conditions, especially those of a "neurotic" variety, would be aggra-
vated at this time. Id. Under this theory, sources of stress other than PMS, such as domestic
difficulties and illness, should cause the same symptoms and behavioral responses that are
exhibited during periods of PMS suffering. Id. Therefore, the type of emotional reactions
and behavior resulting from PMS will be determined by the woman's personality rather
than being triggered by endocrine changes. Id.
"4 See Reid & Yen, supra note 13, at 89. Although personality factors and environmen-
tal settings probably are important to the development of PMS symptoms, id., the physio-
logical changes resulting from hormonal fluctuations generally precede and may determine
the resultant psychic reactions, id.; see Israel, Premenstrual Tension, 110 J. AM. MED. A-
1721, 1721-23 (1983).
"' See Menstruation & Crime, supra note 40, at 1753. The hormonal changes occurring
during menstruation seem to make women less amenable to discipline during the premen-
strual stage. See Dalton, Schoolgirls' Behavior and Menstruation, 2 BRrr. MED. J. 1647,
1648-49 (1960). Consequently, the PMS sufferer may display an inability to conform to law-
ful standards of conduct, and, thus, engage in criminal behavior. See Menstruation and
Crime, supra note 40, at 1753.
46 See Note, supra note 31, at 214-19. The very fact that women develop battered wo-
man's syndrome suggests that police training and procedure, and prosecution policies re-
lated to domestic violence, are inadequate. Id. at 215-16.
"I See Stewart, supra note 33, at 415. In addition to bearing on criminal responsibility,
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the battered woman's syndrome and PMS, mental disorders associ-
ated with the menstrual cycle and the psychological scars left by
spousal abuse occasionally were used to excuse a woman's criminal
behavior or to mitigate her punishment.48 During the 19th century,
menstrual irregularities often were considered a source of mental
illness and a basis for applying the insanity defense.49 Increased
research about both syndromes, and the advent of the women's
movement, 50 have resulted in the suggestion that battered woman's
syndrome and PMS may provide novel bases for defenses to crimi-
nal liability.r1
the effects of PMS, such as impaired motor coordination and emotional disturbances, may
limit the civil tort liability of sufferers. See Stewart, Premenstrual Tension in Automobile
Accidents, 6 CLE v.-MAR. L. REv. 17, 18 (1957).
" See Reid v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 188 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966),
overruled, Van Eaton v. State, 205 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1967); People v. Giacalone, 242 Mich. 16,
217 N.W. 758 (1928); Kress v. State, 176 Tenn. 478, 144 S.W.2d 735 (1940). In Reid, the
Florida Real Estate Commission had suspended defendant's real estate license because she
was charged with shoplifting. 188 So. 2d at 848. Finding that the defendant was suffering
from emotional problems related to menopause, the court reversed the commission's deci-
sion. Id. at 855-56. Although Reid and its underlying acceptance of the irresistible impulse
test of insanity was later overruled, it is submitted that the court's determination that men-
opause is a legally recognizable mental defect is still valid.
4' See A. JoNEs, supra note 6, at 158-66. Physicians in the late 1800's agreed that men-
struation could trigger various nervous ailments, kleptomania, pyromania, homicide, and su-
icide. Id. at 161; see C. LOMBROSo, THE FEMALE OFFENDER 295 (1895). The mental frailty
associated with women by society made insanity the ideal plea for female criminal defen-
dants. A. JoNEs, supra note 6, at 158. Indeed, insanity induced by menstruation became a
popular defense, especially for upper-class women, in the 1860's. See id. at 204.
50 See, e.g., A. HEMPHILL & C. HEMPHILL, JR., WorNLAw 44-51 (1981) (discussion of
prevalent social problem of wife-beating); R. LANGLEY & R. LEvY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT
CRIsIs 6-10 (1977) (same); E. PIzzEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHEORS WILL HEAR 5
(1977) (same); Note, supra note 16, at 226 (same). While the first description of PMS as a
cyclical disorder occurring prior to menstruation was made in 1931, see Frank, 26 ARcH.
NEuRo. PSYCHIATRY 1053, 1054 (1931), only recently has the work of modem researchers like
Dr. Dalton brought the syndrome to the attention of the public, see Gray, Raging Female
Hormones in the Courts, 94 MAcLEANs 46, 46 (June 15, 1981). Similarly, only within the last
decade has a significant amount of research on battered women been conducted. See D.
MARTIN, supra note 18, at 8; E. PizzEY, supra, at 7; L. WALKER, supra note 12, at ix.
Feminist legal theory has focused on these two issues in an attempt to achieve equal
judicial treatment for women. See A. HEMPHILL & C. HEMPHILL, JR., supra, at 44-51; Note,
supra note 16, at 226.
51 See Oleck, Legal Aspects of Premenstrual Tension, 166 INT'L REC. MED. 475 (1953);
Stewart, supra note 33, at 415; Note, supra note 31, at 229. Evidence of the repeated verbal
and physical abuse leading to the development of battered woman's syndrome can be admit-
ted in connection with an assertion of self-defense. See Note, supra note 12, at 122 n.2.
Other possible legal strategies that battered women could use include proving provocation
or extreme emotional disturbance as mitigating circumstances, or pleading temporary in-
sanity. Id. Similarly, a severe case of PMS could be analogized to temporary insanity or
incompetency. Stewart, supra note 33, at 415.
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Commentators have predicted the use of PMS in conjunction
with insanity and diminished capacity defenses, 2 but PMS has yet
to be asserted successfully in a single case in the United States.53
In a recent New York State decision, a woman accused of assault-
ing her four-year-old daughter asserted a defense of diminished ca-
pacity based on PMS54 Ruling on a motion to dismiss in the Crim-
inal Court, Judge Becker concluded that a defense based on PMS
was admissible. 5 However, since the defendant chose to plead
guilty to harassment, a lesser charge, the PMS issue was never
litigated. 6
Notwithstanding the reluctance of courts in the United States
to accept PMS as a defense to criminal charges, a PMS defense
has been asserted successfully in British and Canadian courts.6
Shoplifting charges against an Ottawa woman were dropped when
medical evidence established that she had suffered from PMS
since her teens.6 8 Subsequent Canadian decisions have considered
PMS as a basis for mitigating sentences. 59 In Great Britain, courts
have mitigated the sentences of PMS sufferers charged with vio-
lent crimes.60 In R. v. Smith,61 defendant Sandie Smith, a recidi-
vist with thirty prior convictions, was charged with threatening to
52 See Gray, supra note 50, at 49; Stewart, supra note 33, at 427.
53 See Note, supra note 16, at 223.
" Chambers, Menstrual Stress as a Legal Defense, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1982, at 46,
col. 5. A defendant in a New York case, Shirley Santos, was charged with beating her daugh-
ter for refusing to be quiet. Id. Santos, described as "distraught and remorseful," stated that
at the time of the beating she had just begun to menstruate, and felt tired and depressed.
Id.; see Brozan, supra note 17, at C16, col. 2.
y5 See Tell, PMS' United States Court Debut: Hint of Future Success, 4 NAT'L L.J.,
May 10, 1982, at 5, col. 2; Press Release by Stephanie Benson, attorney for defendant Shir-
ley Santos (Nov. 1982). In a bench order, Judge Becker noted that temporary mental
problems often lead to mitigation of criminal charges. Press Release by Stephanie Benson,
supra.
5' Bird, supra note 14, at B4, col. 4. After pleading guilty to harassment, Santos was
given a conditional discharge with the stipulation that she would undergo counseling. Id.
57 See Gray, supra note 50, at 46.
58 Id. Canadian courts have dismissed criminal charges for minor offenses based on evi-
dence that the defendant suffered from hormonal changes resulting from menopause or
postnatal psychosis. Id.
11 See id. Two cases heard in Toronto resulted in probation and conditional discharge
based upon PMS evidence. Id.
6" See Tybor, Women on Trial: New Defense, 4 NAT'L L.J., Feb. 15, 1982, at 1, col 5;
British Legal Debate: Premenstrual Tension and Criminal Behavior, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29,
1981, at C3, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as British Legal Debate].
61 R. v. Smith, No. 1/A/82 (Crim. App. April 27, 1982) (available June 10, 1985, on
LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
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kill a police officer.6 2 Because she was suffering from PMS at the
time of the criminal acts Smith was sentenced to only three years
probation. 3 Another British defendant used evidence of her PMS
affliction to defend successfully against a murder charge.6 4 The de-
fendant, after quarreling with her lover, ran him over with a car. 5
Allegedly suffering from "an extremely aggravated form of
premenstrual condition,"66 the defendant pleaded guilty to the re-
duced charge of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibil-
ity, and was conditionally discharged.6
Unlike PMS defenses, criminal defenses based upon battered
woman's syndrome have been asserted successfully in many Ameri-
can jurisdictions.6 8 The crucial issue in these cases is whether bat-
tered woman's syndrome is a proper subject for expert testimony. 9
62 Id.
'3 Tybor, supra note 60, at 1, col. 5. In Smith, the court refused to grant an acquittal
because such a disposition would have required relinquishing all control over the defendant.
R. v. Smith, No. 1/A/82 (Crim. App. April 27, 1982) (available June 10, 1985, on LEXIS,
Enggen library, Cases file). The court concluded that an acquittal would create too great a
danger to society. Id.
6 See British Legal Debate, supra note 60, at C3, col.5.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
65 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 635-39 (D.C. 1979) (court should
allow expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome), rev'd on other grounds on remand
and aff'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983). The courts in the following cases all determined that
expert testimony should be allowed in battered woman's syndrome. See Hawthorne v. State,
408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 618-19, 277
S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 358, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217-18
(1983); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 776, 424
A.2d 171, 173 (1980); People v. Torres, N.Y.L.J., April 26, 1985, at 13, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County, April 25, 1985); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 204, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (1984); State v:
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819 (N.D. 1983); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d
312, 316 (1984). But see State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 165, 610 P.2d 522, 524 (1980)
(court refused to admit evidence of battered woman's syndrome); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981) (same); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378
(Wyo. 1981) (same). The recent New York decision, People v. Torres, N.Y.L.J., April 26,
1985, at 13, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County, April 25, 1985), was based, in part, on the Appel-
late Division decision in People v. Emick, 103 App. Div. 2d 643, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't
1984), see N.Y.L.J., April 26, 1985, at 14, col. 2 n.2. The trial court in Emick allowed exten-
sive testimony on the battered woman's syndrome, a decision which was not considered by
the appellate court. See People v. Emick, 103 App. Div. 2d at 654-55, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
69 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C. 1979) (determining
whether trial court's exclusion of expert testimony on subject of battered women was error),
rev'd on other grounds on remand and afi'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); State v. Kelly, 97
N.J. 178, 206, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (1984) (central issue is whether expert testimony on bat-
tered woman's syndrome is admissible); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1375 (Wyo. 1981)
(excluding testimony of psychologist offered by defense was not reversible error).
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When admissible, the testimony is aimed at establishing that the
defendant's reaction to an apparently non-threatening situation
was in fact self-defense. 70
In People v. Minnis,71 an Illinois woman was charged with
murdering her husband.72 Defense counsel sought to offer evidence
on the battered woman's syndrome to explain both the murder and
the subsequent dismemberment of the victim's body.73 Reversing
the lower court's ruling to exclude the evidence, 74 the Illinois Cir-
cuit Court concluded that "[t]he defendant had a right to present
evidence relevant to her explanation of her conduct, no matter how
far-fetched it might appear to the average individual. '75 In State v.
Kelly,76 the defendant was indicted for murdering her husband by
stabbing him with a scissors as he ran toward her.77 Asserting that
she acted in self-defense, the defendant offered expert testimony
on battered woman's syndrome to establish that at the time of her
husband's approach she believed she was in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily harm.78 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
concluded that the expert testimony was "directly relevant" to the
issue of the defendant's state of mind.79
Courts which have accepted expert testimony on battered wo-
man's syndrome have held that the reasonableness of the battered
woman's acts is beyond the average juror's ability to understand, 0
and that the syndrome is sufficiently accepted in the scientific
community to allow admission of the expert testimony.8 1 Since
70 See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 631 (D.C 1979), rev'd on other
grounds on remand and aff'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591,
595, 682 P.2d 312, 315 (1984).
11 118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 455 N.E.2d 209 (1983).
12 Id. at 346, 455 N.E.2d at 211.
73 Id.
71 Id. at 357, 455 N.E.2d at 218.
75 Id.
71 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984).
7" Id. at 189-90, 478 A.2d. at 369.
18 Id. at 201, 478 A.2d at 375.
79 Id. at 202, 478 A.2d at 375.
so See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979) (battered
woman's syndrome "beyond the ken" of the ordinary juror), rev'd on other grounds on re-
mand and af'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 807 (Fla.
1982) (jury would not understand defendant's circumstance without expert testimony);
State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 519, 595, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984) (appropriate for jury to hear
helpful testimony on battered woman's syndrome).
81 See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638-39 (D.C. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds on remand and af'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591,
596-97, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (1984).
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many cases in which a battered woman's syndrome defense is
raised involve situations in which the woman did not strike out
against her abuser until after his attack had ended or before it had
begun,82 only through an explanation of the effects and nature of
battered woman's syndrome can the jury understand how the de-
fendant honestly and reasonably believed that her life was in dan-
ger.s3 Although evidence of battered woman's syndrome may not
necessarily result in acquittal, 4 the majority of jurisdictions that
have considered the testimony have determined that it is necessary
for a fair trial.8 5
Courts refusing to admit evidence of battered woman's syn-
drome generally have found that the defendant's state of mind and
the reasonableness of her actions could be determined adequately
by the jury without the aid of expert testimony. " Evidence of bat-
tered woman's syndrome also has been denied admission based on
the courts' conclusion that the syndrome has not gained sufficient
acceptance among the scientific community.8 7
82 See, e.g., State v. Leidhoim, 334 N.W.2d 811, 813-14 (N.D. 1983) (defendant stabbed
husband with butcher knife after he had fallen asleep); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 189-90,
478 A.2d 364, 369 (1984) (defendant stabbed husband as he came running toward her after
attack); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 592-593, 682 P.2d 312, 313-14 (1984) (defendant
shot husband while he was lying on couch after he threatened to kill her); Buhrle v. State,
627 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Wyo. 1981) (defendant shot husband after argument, through partially
closed door).
83 See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 204, 478 A.2d 364, 377 (1984). Permitting the defen-
dant to introduce evidence on battered women's syndrome enables the jury to perceive the
situation from the point of view of the defendant, and to reach a fully informed decision on
whether her fear was reasonable. See State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312,
316 (1984).
84 See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 813, 819 (N.D. 1983) (evidence of bat-
tered woman's syndrome admitted at trial resulted in reduction of charge of murder to con-
viction of manslaughter); see also People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 356-57, 455 N.E.2d
209, 217 (1983) (defendant sought to introduce evidence of battered woman's syndrome to
rebut prosecution's evidence of her consciousness of guilt).
8" See State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981) (defendant entitled to new trial
because suppression of evidence of battered woman's syndrome may have affected jury's
consideration of self-defense claim); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202-03, 478 A.2d 364, 376
(1984) (expert testimony was central to defendant's claim of self-defense, therefore, exclu-
sion cannot be harmless error); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316
(1984) (evidence is central to defendant's claim of self-defense).
88 See State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 165, 610 P.2d 522, 524 (1980); State v. Thomas,
66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378
(Wyo. 1981).
87 See State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981); Buhrle
v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Wyo. 1981). The test for admission of scientific evidence was
annunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923): Just when a scientific
principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is
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III. BATTERED WOMAN'S SYNDROME AND PREMENSTRUAL
SYNDROME: A THREE-LEVELED COMPARISON
It is submitted that there are three bases of comparison for
criminal defenses based on the battered woman's syndrome and
defenses based on PMS: first, the underlying theory of the defense
involved; second, the stage of scientific acceptance and knowledge
that each of the syndromes has reached; and third, the social and
policy implications arising from the legal use of each syndrome.
The remainder of this Note will examine the distinctions that have
arisen from these bases and determine whether such distinctions
are valid and warrant the disparate judicial treatment that has
been given to PMS and battered woman's syndrome.
A. The Traditional Legal Defenses Involved
Evidence of battered woman's syndrome generally is offered in
conjunction with self-defense pleas.8  The self-defense plea, unlike
the plea of insanity, pursuant to which PMS evidence is offered, is
more susceptible to the use of a novel psychological theory for two
reasons.8 9 First, evidence of a victim's reputation for violence and
aggression can generally be introduced to support a plea of self-
defense if the defendant knew of the victim's reputation.90 In the
past, women attempting to justify their violent conduct as self-de-
fense have been permitted to testify to their husband's history of
difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.
Id. at 1014. The Frye test is the most commonly relied on standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evi-
dence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1200 (1980).
88 See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds on remand and afl'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801,
805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 612, 277 S.E.2d 678, 678 (1981);
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 519, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1981). But cf. State v. Baker,
120 N.H. 773, 775-76, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (1980) (evidence of battered woman's syndrome
properly admitted to rebut defendant's insanity plea in trial for wife's murder).
89 Compare infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text (battered woman's syndrome
and self-defense) with infra notes 110-127 and accompanying text (PMS and insanity).
8 See Smith v. United States, 161 U.S. 85, 88 (1896); Brooks v. State, 263 Ala. 386, 389,
82 So. 2d 553, 555 (1955); Karr v. State, 100 Ala. 4, 5, 14 So. 851, 852 (1894); Lowe v. State,
612 S.W.2d 579, 580-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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brutal behavior 1 Thus, before evidence of battered woman's syn-
drome ever was offered in court, the concept that prior spousal
abuse might be used to justify subsequent domestic violence al-
ready was entrenched firmly in the law.92 Second, the regular pat-
tern of abuse that battered women experience and anticipate93 is
relevant to establishing the elements required to prove self-defense
94-the genuine and reasonable belief that the defendant was in
imminent danger of death or serious injury,95 and that the degree
of force used was reasonable. 6
The utility of evidence on battered woman's syndrome in de-
termining the reasonableness of the woman's fear will depend or
whether the jurisdiction uses a subjective or objective evidence test
in determining reasonableness.' 7 Evidence of battered woman's
91 See, e.g., United States v. McIntire, 461 F.2d 1092, 1092 (5th Cir. 1972); People v.
Adams, 71 Ill. App. 3d 70, 75, 388 N.E.2d 1326, 1329-30 (1979). In McIntire, the Fifth Cir-
cuit concluded that the trial court erred by not allowing corroborating evidence on defen-
dant's testimony that her husband beat her when he was intoxicated. 461 F.2d at 1092. The
defendant had claimed that while her husband was intoxicated she killed him in self-de-
fense. Id. In Adams, an Illinois appellate court held that the defendant, who had lived with
her victim for five and one-half years, should have been allowed to testify that she knew he
had killed someone in the past. 71 IlM. App. 3d at 75, 388 N.E.2d at 1329-30.
92 See supra note 91.
9s See Walker, Thyfault & Browne, Beyond the Juror's Ken: Battered Women, 7 VT. L.
REv. 1, 4, 6 (1982); Schneider, supra note 12, at 634-35. The cyclic theory of violence used to
explain battered woman's syndrome demonstrates that battering follows a pattern and be-
comes increasingly more severe with time. Walker, Thyfault & Browne, supra, at 6. The
battered woman usually believes that the battering incident that immediately preceded her
striking back was more severe or life-threatening than prior incidents. Schneieder, supra
note 12, at 634.
94 See, e.g., People v. Minnis, 118 IM. App. 3d 345, 356, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217 (1983).
Courts that have admitted expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome have done so to
allow an explanation of why the woman reasonably believed that her life was in danger and
why deadly force was required to escape her batterer. See id. at 356, 455 N.E.2d at 217;
Note, supra note 12, at 130-32.
" See Note, Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills
and Tells Why, 34 STAN. L. REv. 615, 618 (1982). The syndrome can be used to explain why
the seemingly unreasonable degree of fear experienced by the battered woman was not truly
unreasonable in light of her past experience with her attacker. See id.
9 See id. A battered woman's attempts to use unarmed self-defense often trigger in-
creased violence on the part of her abuser. Schneider, supra note 12, at 632. However, a
defendant may only use deadly force when she reasonably believes it necessary to avoid
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Note, supra note 95, at 622-23; see
Schneider, supra note 12, at 632-33. Thus, under a strict interpretation of the deadly force
rule, the battered woman's use of a deadly weapon is unreasonable unless she can introduce
evidence of the syndrome to demonstrate that her actions were justified. See Schneider,
supra note 12, at 633.
07 See Eber, supra note 12, at 927. An objective standard of reasonableness requires the
factfinder to consider the acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances that ex-
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syndrome would be less acceptable in objective evidence jurisdic-
tions in which the unique physical and psychological characteris-
tics of the particular defendant generally are not considered." It is
submitted that legislative change may be required in an objective
jurisdiction to create classes of defendants, such as battered
women, to whom a different standard of reasonableness would be
applied. 99 Under a subjective evidence test, expert testimony on
the syndrome could be used to demonstrate the genuineness of the
woman's belief in the immediacy of the danger, 100 and to demon-
strate whether the amount of force used by the woman was reason-
isted at the time of the killing from the perspective of a reasonable and prudent person. See
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 817 (N.D. 1983). The law, of course, does not require a
perfect calculation of what reasonableness under the circumstances involves. See Brown v.
United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) ("[dletached reflection cannot be demanded in the
presence of an uplifted knife"); Note, supra note 95, at 623.
Under the subjective standard, the jury must decide whether the circumstances faced
by the accused were sufficient to induce an honest and reasonable belief in the individual
defendant's mind that the degree of force used was necessary to defend herself against im-
minent harm. See Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 817.
98 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983); Eber, supra note 12, at 927-
28; Note, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Subject of Battered Woman, 4
CRIM. JUST. J. 161, 176 (1980); Note, supra note 95, at 619. Under the objective test the
defendant is judged on the basis of how a reasonable person would have behaved in the
same circumstances. Note, supra note 95, at 618-19. Therefore, expert testimony on bat-
tered woman's syndrome aimed at demonstrating the individual defendant's state of mind is
irrelevant. See id. at 619.
" A legislative exception to the deadly force rule would be required to allow juries in
objective evidence jurisdictions to apply a lower standard of reasonableness to a battered
woman using force against an unarmed attacker. See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,
817 (N.D. 1983). An objective rule could be phrased to allow a battered woman to use
deadly force against an assailant who previously had abused her. Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
545 (West 1985) (upon proof of past acts of abuse by spouse, court may issue temporary
restraining order). Thus, battered women would be allowed to introduce expert testimony to
the extent necessary to establish that they are afflicted with the syndrome. Cf. James &
Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REv. 697,
701-02 (1952) (applying particular standard of care to professionals in negligence cases re-
quires expert testimony). The jury would be required to determine if the defendant was in
fact a "battered woman," and whether she acted reasonably within the limitations permit-
ted by the special exception to the deadly force rule. Cf. McPherson v. Ellis, 305 N.C. 266,
270, 287 S.E.2d 892, 895 (1982) (physician judged by particular standard of care must show
adherence to standards of medical community).
"00 See Eber, supra note 12, at 928; cf. Crawford v. State, 363 So. 2d 107, 108 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1978) (deceased's threatening words and gestures were admissible on issue of
defendant's apprehension of immediate danger); Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1058-59
(Alaska 1980) (evidence of victim's violent nature admissible on issue of defendant's appre-
hension of imminent danger, if such nature is known to defendant); State v. Lui, 603 P.2d
151, 154 (Hawaii 1979) (evidence of victim's violent character admissible to show reasona-
bleness of defendant's apprehension of immediate danger).
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able under the circumstances.'
In State v. Wanrow, 02 the Washington Supreme Court noted
the unfairness of judging the acts of female defendants asserting a
plea of self-defense under the traditional, objective standards of
reasonableness. 10 3 The Wanrow court concluded that under a sub-
jective self-defense standard, women would have their conduct
judged in light of their individual physical abilities and percep-
tions, 04 which may have been colored by being the victims of years
of sex discrimination. 0 5 Although there was no pre-existing rela-
tionship between the defendant and victim in Wanrow, the princi-
ples applied in the decision should be equally applicable when con-
sidering the admissibility of evidence of battered woman's
syndrome. 0 6 Relying on the subjective test of Wanrow, the Wash-
101 See Schneider, supra note 12, at 631-33; Note, supra note 95, at 623. Generally, the
amount of force that a person may use must reasonably be related to the harm sought to be
avoided. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 2, § 53, at 392. Under the "equal force rule,"
deadly force may justifiably be used in self-defense only if one reasonably believes that one's
attacker is about to exert deadly force, and such force is necessary to repel the attack. See
Schneider, supra note 12, at 631-32. Thus, evidence of battered woman's syndrome would be
especially relevant in situations in which a deadly weapon was used to repel an unarmed
attacker. See Easterling v. State, 267 P.2d 185, 188 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954); Walker,
Thyfault & Browne, supra note 93, at 5; Note, supra note 95, at 623. Many battered women
resort to deadly weapons in resisting unarmed aggressors because of their disadvantage in
size and strength. See Schneider, supra note 12, at 632-33. The inadequacy of a woman's
physical strength to repel an attack is accentuated by the fact that such defensive efforts
often result in increased violence against her. Id. at 632. The application of the traditional
deadly force rule often severely damages a woman's claim of self-defense in cases in which
she has used deadly force against an unarmed aggressor because such force will often be
deemed unreasonable. Id. at 633. The equal force rule has been reinterpreted, in one juris-
diction, to suggest that a woman's ability to defend herself against a man is so inadequate
that the law will allow her to use a deadly weapon. See State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221,
239, 559 P.2d 548, 559 (1977) ("care must be taken to assure that our self-defense instruc-
tions afford women the right to have their conduct judged in light of the individual physical
handicaps which are the product of sex discrimination"); see also Easterling, 267 P.2d at
188-89 (disparity in size and strength between sexes may justify woman's use of weapon
against unarmed male attacker).
102 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
103 Id. at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 558-59. In Wanrow, the Washington Supreme Court af-
firmed a lower appellate court's reversal of the defendant's murder conviction. Id. at 224,
559 P.2d at 550. The defendant shot and killed a man who she believed had molested her
friend's daughter and had tried to molest her son, when the victim would not leave the
house where the defendant was staying. Id. at 224-25, 559 P.2d at 550-51.
104 Id. at 239-40, 559 P.2d at 559.
105 Id.; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
100 See Eber, supra note 12, at 926. The Wanrow decision recognized that additional
considerations are present in a battering situation that are not found in traditional self-
defense situations. Id. These considerations include the wife's dependency on her husband,
inadequate legal remedies available to the woman, and the traditional notion that women
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ington Supreme Court later adopted a subjective test to justify the
acceptance of evidence on battered woman's syndrome in State v.
Allery. 017 In Allery, the defendant shot her unarmed husband
while he was lying on a couch.10 8 Testimony on battered woman's
syndrome was deemed necessary to explain the defendant's mental
state, and to "overcome stereotyped impressions" about battered
women who stay with their mates. 0 9
The doctrines of insanity and diminished capacity that under-
lie defenses based on PMS"0O lack some of the factors that have
permitted battered woman's syndrome to gain legal acceptance."'
The belief that menstruation is a source of mental illness, common
in the 19th century, " 2 has long since dissipated."3 Additionally,
insanity defenses recently have been subjected to intense scrutiny
and debate, and have been sharply criticized by both the legal and
lay communities. 1 4 Use of the PMS defense is handicapped fur-
ther by the fact that the elements of the insanity defense are not
well-settled." 5 Most modern jurisdictions apply either the tradi-
should not engage in physical confrontations. Id.
107 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984).
100 Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 314. The defendant had been subjected to consistent physical
abuse by her husband. Id. at 592, 682 P.2d at 313. On the night of the homicide, the defen-
dant entered her house and unexpectedly confronted her husband, who previously had been
served with a restraining order to keep away from her. Id. After the husband threatened to
kill the defendant, she went into the bedroom and tried unsuccessfully to escape through a
window. Id. The defendant heard a metallic noise and believed her husband was getting a
knife from the kitchen. Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 313-14. The defendant then shot her husband
as he was reclining on a couch. Id. at 593, 682 P.2d at 314.
109 Id. at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
"' See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 233; Stewart, supra note 33, at 415. Insanity
and diminished capacity defenses have been predicated on extreme depression and anxiety,
frequently occurring symptoms of PMS, when such symptoms are presented in connection
with other mental defects and diseases. See Stewart, supra note 33, at 415.
. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
112 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
13 See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 233.
114 See, e.g., N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 32 (1983) (plea of incompe-
tency to stand trial and insanity defense should be abolished); Smith, Limiting the Insanity
Defense: A Rational Approach to Irrational Crimes, 47 Mo. L. REv. 605, 615 (1982) (elimi-
nate insanity as special defense and consider mental competence only in considering state of
mind needed for crime charged).
Ill See Smith, supra note 114, at 607-09. The methods for determining legal insanity
lack uniformity. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 36, at 269. There are four
different definitions of insanity for the purposes of substantive criminal law. See Smith,
supra note 114, at 607-09. The terms of the various standards are so vague as to invite
"semantic jousting" and "metaphysical speculation." W. LAFAvE & A- Scor, supra note 2, §
36, at 272, (citing 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING
PAPERS 249 (1970)). Suggested insanity defense reforms have included the recognition of a
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tional M'Naghten rule1 16 or the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code rule"1 7 to determine whether the defendant's conduct
can be excused by reason of mental incompetence.'
Under the M'Naghten test, an insanity defense is established
by clear proof that at the time of the criminal act, the defendant
suffered from a defect of reason, or disease of the mind, to render
her incapable of knowing the nature and quality of her acts, or
that her acts were wrong.1 9 Thus, to satisfy the M'Naghten test, a
PMS sufferer would have to establish that her infirmity gave rise
to the existence of a legally acceptable "disease of the mind," and
a resultant inability to know the nature and quality of her act or
that it was wrong. 2 ' The concept of "disease of the mind" as used
in the M'Naghten test is narrower than the psychiatric concept of
mental disease, and generally is limited to disorders such as psy-
chosis, schizophrenia, and paranoia.' 2' Since these mental disor-
ders frequently are associated with PMS, evidence of PMS would
seem relevant to the mental disease requirement of the M'Naghten
test. 22 However, under a strict interpretation of the M'Naghten
"guilty but mentally ill" verdict, the use of bifurcated trials in which guilt and insanity are
determined separately, and the adoption of diminished capacity as a mitigating factor. See
Robitscher & Haynes, In Defense of the Insanity Defense, 31 EMORY L.J. 9, 13-29 (1982).
I See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
117 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, reprinted in 10 U.LA 490-91 (1962).
218 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 2, § 36, at 269. This analysis will not consider the
irresistible impulse test or the Durham rule, each of which is followed in only a minority of
jurisdictions. The irresistible impulse test, which holds that a defendant should not be
found guilty by reason of insanity if he could not control his conduct, is used in conjunction
with the M'Naghten rule. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INsAN'TY DEFENSE 67 (1967). The Durham
approach, which holds that the defendant is not criminally liable if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect, see Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75
(D.C. Cir. 1954), has been abandoned in the jurisdiction that created it, see United States v.
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
1 9 M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722; see Reese v. Wainwright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1090
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979); Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); State v. Johnson, 223 Kan. 237, 240, 573 P.2d 994, 997 (1977).
120 See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 246.
121 See State v. Nuetzel, 61 Hawaii 531, 543-44, 606 P.2d 920, 928 (1980); State v.
Pagano, 294 N.C. 729, 735, 242 S.E.2d 825, 829 (1978); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 268 Pa.
Super. 15, 19, 407 A.2d 413, 416 (1979). The M'Naghten test does not require the precise
definition of the mental disease involved as long as some organic or functional factor is
identified as responsible for the defendant's conduct. Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at
239; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 118, at 47. Any mental abnormality such as psychosis, neuro-
sis, organic brain disorder, or congenital intellectual deficiency will suffice if it rendered the
defendant incapable of knowing the nature and gravity of his acts, or that they were wrong.
See State v. Edmon, 28 Wash. App. 98, 107-08, 621 P.2d 1310, 1315-16 (1981).
122 See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 241. PMS is sometimes manifested by seri-
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rule, only the most severely psychotic individuals can meet the re-
quirement of an "inability to know the nature of the act or that it
was wrong," 123 thus making it difficult for PMS sufferers to satisfy
the M'Naghten test.124 It is possible, however, that a severe case of
PMS would render the defendant entirely incapable of knowing
right from wrong, and thus satisfy the standards even in a strict
M'Naghten jurisdiction. 25 Many M'Naghten jurisdictions have
broadly construed this requirement,1 2 however, and under such
flexible standards, evidence of PMS is more likely to satisfy the
M'Naghten criteria.127
The Model Penal Code test relieves the criminal responsibility
of a person who at the time of her criminal acts, due to mental
disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality (wrongfulness) of her conduct, or to conform her
conduct to the requirements of law.128 An insanity defense based
ous mental diseases capable of causing total cognitive disorientation. Id. Once it is accepted
that PMS can interfere with cognitive abilities, defense counsel must then prove that the
syndrome actually caused such an interference in his client. See id.
123 Id.; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 118, at 49; see also Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 588-
94, 115 A.2d 502, 512-15 (1955) (defendant found capable of distinguishing right from
wrong, although bordering mental deficiency and afflicted with neurosis). Under a restrictive
interpretation of the M'Naghten rule, defendants who are mentally ill, but whose illness
does not fall squarely within the parameters of traditionally diagnosable infirmities, may be
held criminally liable. See, e.g., Reece v. State, 212 Ga. 609, 609-10, 94 S.E.2d 723, 725
(1956).
12 See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 246.
121 Id. at 248. It is suggested that severe PMS should be treated like temporary insanity
resulting from insane delusions. Courts have allowed evidence relating to insane delusions as
the basis for a successful defense of insanity. H. FINGARETTr & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISAmI-
TIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSmILrry 32 (1979); see Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 80
(D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Rozier v. State, 185 Ga. 317, 320, 195 S.E.
172, 174-75 (1938); State v. Nicholson, 1 Wash. App. 853, 855, 466 P.2d 181, 182 (1970). To
satisfy the M'Naghten test, an insane delusion must be the result of a mental disease, and
the facts, as the defendant in her deluded state perceived them, must be sufficient to justify
the defendant's act. See Biddy v. State, 138 Ga. App. 4, 8, 225 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1976).
"I See, e.g., State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 207, 403 P.2d 521, 525-26 (1965), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 1015 (1966); Thompson v. State, 159 Neb. 685, 691, 68 N.W.2d 267, 271
(1955); see Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 247.
"I See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 248. A broader interpretation of the knowl-
edge requirement allows mental conditions other than extreme psychosis to be the bases for
an insanity defense. Id. at 249. Thus, to the extent that these additional conditions are
symptoms of PMS, the likelihood that PMS evidence will be admitted is increased. Id.
228 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1), reprinted in 10 U.L.A. 490 (1974). The Code test
utilizes the same elements as the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests, but sets them
forth in broader terms. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 2, § 38, at 293. Insanity, as
defined by the Code, excludes mental diseases or defects that are manifested only by "re-
peated criminal or otherwise anti-social behavior." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2), reprinted
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on PMS would probably be more successful in jurisdictions using
the Model Penal Code test because the Code test ameliorates many
of the harsh M'Naghten requirements. 12 9 While the M'Naghten
prerequisite to establishing legal insanity is a total lack of cogni-
tive or behavioral capacity, the Model Penal Code requires only a
lack of substantial capacity to appreciate criminality or to conform
behavior. 130 Additionally, a requirement that the defendant merely
"appreciates," rather than "knows," the nature of her criminal acts
allows the admission of evidence of the defendant's intellectual,
and emotional state at the time of the act. 3 ' Therefore, to the ex-
tent that PMS causes an individual to lack the substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of her act, or to con-
form her conduct to the requirements of law, evidence of PMS will
be relevant to establishing a defense of insanity under the Code
test.1
32
Although PMS may not satisfy the insanity test in certain ju-
risdictions, evidence of the syndrome generally will be relevant on
the issue of diminished capacity.133 The doctrine of diminished ca-
pacity permits evidence of an abnormal mental condition, not
amounting to legal insanity, to be admitted whenever it is relevant
to prove that the defendant did not have the requisite mental state
in 10 U.LA at 491. This limitation has been criticized, see, e.g., Weihofen, The Law and the
Mentally Ill: The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1960), and as a
result, several jurisdictions have adopted the Code test without it, see, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §
552.030 (Vernon 1966); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney Supp. 1985). The restriction
may make it difficult for PMS sufferers whose only behavioral symptom is recurrent crimi-
nal behavior to enter evidence concerning the syndrome. See Dalton, Cyclical Criminal Acts
in Premenstrual Syndrome, 2 LANcET 1070, 1071 (Nov. 1980). Most sufferers, however, ex-
perience a group of symptoms evidencing the underlying disorder, and these symptoms re-
sult in behavioral abnormalities other than criminal psychopathy. See supra note 33.
129 See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 258; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 114, at 87;
Smith, supra note 114, at 608.
130 Compare M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722 (defendant must not know nature of
her act or that it was wrong) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1), reprinted in 10 ULA at
490 (defendant must not appreciate criminality of her conduct).
1' See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 2, § 38, at 293; Wallach & Rubin, supra note
13, at 259; see also State v. Johnson, 121 R.L 254, 268, 399 A.2d 469, 477 (1979) (test requir-
ing appreciation of wrongfulness allows more expansive view of whether defendant under-
stood nature of her acts).
132 See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 260.
133 See Note, supra note 33, at 190. The diminished capacity doctrine has also been
referred to as "diminished responsibility," see People v. Gallegos, 628 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo.
1981); McCarty v. State, 372 A.2d 180, 182 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), or "partial responsibility,"
see State v. Strubberg, 616 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Mo. 1981); State v. Booth, 284 Or. 615, 618, 588
P.2d 614, 615 (1978).
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necessary to commit the crime charged. 3 4 Establishing that the
defendant acted with diminished capacity will mitigate, but not ex-
cuse, criminal liability.13 5 Thus, evidence establishing that the de-
fendant could not form the requisite state of mind for the crime
because of PMS certainly would be relevant to a diminished capac-
ity defense."8'
B. Stage of Acceptance of the Theories
There is some disparity between the degree of acceptance that
PMS and battered woman's syndrome have reached in the scien-
tific community. 37 PMS, having been studied for more than fifty
years, appears to have reached a significant level of acceptance
among doctors and psychiatrists. 38 While the causes of the syn-
drome have not been determined, 39 most researchers agree on the
existence of the syndrome and certain of its identifiable symp-
toms. 140 Battered woman's syndrome, however, has been studied
134 See State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 1891); Commonwealth v. Walzack,
468 Pa. 210, 221, 360 A.2d 914, 919-20 (1976). Diminished capacity is not intended to serve
as an alternative definition of legal insanity, see State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d at 436-37;
Long v. Brewer, 253 N.W.2d 549, 557 (Iowa 1977), rather, the doctrine of diminished capac-
ity concerns the admissibility of psychiatric or psychological evidence for the purpose of
determining whether a particular degree of a crime was committed, see Hensel v. State, 604
P.2d 222, 232 (Alaska 1979); State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 472, 210 A.2d 193, 203 (1965);
State v. Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 222-23, 92 P. 806, 809 (1907).
135 See Note, supra note 33, at 191. British defendants have used PMS-based dimin-
ished capacity defenses successfully to mitigate the crime charged or the sentence imposed.
See id.
136 See id. at 193; Note, supra note 16, at 224.
131 See infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
I" See Stewart, supra note 33, at 410-11. Study of PMS began in the 1930's and fo-
cused on a description and definition of the syndrome. See, e.g., Frank, The Hormonal
Causes of Premenstrual Tension, 26 ARCH. NEUROL. PSYCHIATRY 1053, 1054 (1931); Israel,
Premenstrual Tension, 110 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1721, 1723 (1938). Studies performed in the
late 1950s sought to link PMS to underlying psychiatric disorders. See, e.g., Dalton, Men-
struation and Acute Psychiatric Illness, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 148, 149 (1959); Perr, supra note
13, at 216.
,39 See supra notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text.
4' See, e.g., Brozan, supra note 17, at C16, col. 2; Stewart, supra note 33, at 413. Re-
searchers generally agree that PMS may be defined as a variety of physical, psychological,
and behavioral symptoms occurring in the second half of the menstrual cycle. See Muse,
Cetel, Futterman & Yen, supra note 13, at 1345; Rubinow & Roy-Byrne, supra note 38, at
163; Sanders, Warner, Backstrom & Bancroft, supra note 13, at 487. Recent studies have
concluded that PMS is related to hormonal cycles. See, e.g., Backstrom, Sanders, Leash,
Davidson, Warner & Bancroft, Hormone Levels and their Relationship to the Premenstrual
Syndrome, 45 PSYCHOSOMAUC MED. 503, 505 (1983). Scientists believe that regulation of
hormonal fluctuations may hold the key to successful treatment of PMS. See Muse, Cetel,
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only for the last ten years.141 Although the syndrome currently is
gaining increased acceptance,142 courts have been hesitant to ac-
cept evidence about it because research on battered woman's syn-
drome is still in its infancy.1 43
The current level of acceptance that a particular theory has
achieved among the scientific community is crucial to determine
the admissibility of evidence regarding that theory in jurisdictions
using the Frye v. United States44 standard for admissibility. 14 Al-
though the admissibility of PMS under Frye has never been tested,
there appears to be sufficient acceptance of PMS as a medical the-
ory to support its admissibility under the Frye test.1 46 Battered
Futterman & Yen, supra note 13, at 1348.
"I See Hilberman, supra note 24, at 1336. Lenore Walker's work, THE BATTERED WO-
MAN, credited with naming and defining battered woman's syndrome, was published in 1979.
See L. WALKER, supra note 12. Other works published in the mid to late 1970's examined
domestic violence and wife battering, but did not specifically identify the syndrome. See,
e.g., R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, supra note 50, at 111-25. R. GELLES, supra note 18, at 47-53; D.
MARTIN, supra note 18, at 10-13.
142 See Gayford, supra note 20, at 196; Hilberman, supra note 24, at 1336; Steinmetz,
supra note 27, at 322.
"' See Hilberman, supra note 24, at 1336. Hilberman believes that while sociological
and feminist literature on the syndrome is expansive, not enough traditional clinical and
psychiatric research has been performed. Id. The primary thesis of Steinmetz' study is that
more recent findings on wife abuse require a reformulation of the theories of the causes and
effects of the abuse. See Steinmetz, supra note 27, at 322.
Most courts that have refused to accept evidence on battered woman's syndrome have
noted the lack of acceptance of the syndrome in the scientific community. See Buhrle v.
State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520-21, 423
N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981); see also Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (holding testimony on battered woman's syndrome relevant subject to finding that
study is accepted); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 211, 478 A.2d 364, 380-81 (1984) (case re-
manded to trial court to determine acceptance of expert's methodology in studying battered
woman's syndrome); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 640 (D.C. 1979) (case re-
manded to trial court for further consideration of scientific acceptability), rev'd on other
grounds on remand and afl'd, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
144 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
"' See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Under Frye, a novel scientific technique
must pass into a demonstrable stage, that is, it must be shown to be generally accepted by
the relevant scientific community. See Giannelli, supra note 87, at 1205. Admittedly, some
PMS research has been criticized as suffering from methodological problems, such as the
omission of certain relevant groups from the study, or relying on potentially subjective self
reports. See Notman, supra note 33, at 58; Rubinow & Roy-Byrne, supra note 38, at 163.
While these problems hamper the development of scientific knowledge about PMS they do
not prevent finding a correlation between mental illness and the menstrual cycle. Rubinow
& Roy-Byrne, supra note 38, at 168.
' See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 236; Note, supra note 33, at 185-89. In
applying the Frye standard to PMS, a court should not focus on whether there is agreement
on the cause of PMS within the scientific community, for no such agreement exists. See
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woman's syndrome has been subjected to far less scientific scrutiny
than PMS, yet has passed the Frye test in several jurisdictions. 47
Since PMS has been the subject of more research and documenta-
tion by the medical community than battered woman's syndrome,
it is submitted that PMS should be deemed at least as admissible
as battered woman's syndrome under the Frye test.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, 8 created a modification of Frye that would in-
crease the likelihood that both PMS and battered woman's syn-
drome evidence would be admitted.'4 9 In Ibn-Tamas, a battered
wife, on trial for the murder of her husband, attempted to intro-
duce expert testimony on battered woman's syndrome to establish
her perception of imminent danger at the time of the fatal shoot-
ing.150 The court stated that the acceptability of a scientific theory
should be determined by whether the methodology used in study-
ing and identifying the theory is generally accepted, not whether
the concept derived from the study is accepted.' 5 ' Since battered
woman's syndrome and PMS theories have been developed
through conventional psychological and medical studies, it is sub-
mitted that under the Ibn-Tamas interpretation of the Frye stan-
dard, both theories should be admissible.
In the minority of non-Frye jurisdictions, scientific evidence is
admissible whenever it is relevant to the facts in issue, unless sub-
stantial reasons exist for its exclusion. 52 Since it already has been
Note, supra note 33, at 188. Rather, the focus should be on whether there is general accept-
ance among the scientific community that PMS can impair mental functions to a degree
sufficient to either meet the standard for legal insanity, or negate the specific state of mind
required for criminal responsibility. Id. at 189.
'4 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
407 A.2d 626, 638 (D.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds on remand and aff'd, 455
A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
"' See infra notes 151 & 152 and accompanying text.
'50 407 A.2d at 634.
... Id. at 638. The court concluded that a rejection of a certain theory on the basis that
the state of scientific knowledge in the area is incomplete actually indicates that the court
has determined that no reliable methodology for making the inquiry has been discovered.
Id.
It is undetermined whether the Frye standard merely requires general acceptance of the
scientific techniques employed in studying the theory, or acceptance of both the underlying
theory and the techniques utilized. See Giannelli, supra note 87, at 1211. If the technique is
generally accepted, any theory generated by it should be valid although not fully understood
or explainable. Id. at 1212.
1"2 See, e.g., United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500,
504 (Me. 1978). Under the relevancy approach, a court would have discretion to exclude
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suggested that both battered woman's syndrome and PMS are rel-
evant to the elements of self-defense, insanity, and diminished ca-
pacity pleas respectively,153 no basis exists for treating the theories
dissimilarly in jurisdictions using the general relevancy
approach. 154
C. Policy and Social Implications
PMS and battered woman's syndrome can be validly distin-
guished based on the policy implications associated with each the-
ory. 1 55 Both theories have been criticized for granting preferential
treatment to women,156 however, such criticism is unfounded in
light of the relevancy of PMS and battered woman's syndrome as
valid legal defenses.1 57 Any preferential treatment resulting from
the use of these theories may be necessary to overcome past inci-
dences of sexual discrimination and to provide substantial justice
and fairness to afflicted female defendants. 58
Policy considerations actually have fostered the legal accepta-
bility of battered woman's syndrome.15 9 The admissibility of evi-
dence on battered woman's syndrome is partially attributable to a
growing societal awareness of the plight of abused women.1 60 While
physical retaliation by abused women has not been hailed as a cure
to the problem of domestic violence,161 the admittance of testi-
evidence if its probative value was outweighed by considerations of undue prejudice, mis-
leading the jury, and undue consumption of time. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp.
893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977); Williams, 388 A.2d at 504.
"I See supra notes 88-136 and accompanying text.
114 Cf. Giannelli, supra note 87, at 1204 (under relevancy approach, scientific evidence
treated same as other evidence and will be admitted if technique valid and results relevant).
Under the relevancy approach, novel scientific evidence is treated like all other types of
evidence. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 503-04 (Me. 1978). Disagreement concerning
the degree of acceptance a principle has achieved affects the weight of the evidence, and not
admissibility. See State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Iowa 1980).
"I See infra notes 160-167 and accompanying text.
161 See, e.g., Gray, supra note 50, at 49; Margolick, Court Allows Defense to Call Ex-
perts on Battered Women, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1984, at Al, col. 3. Gray quotes a Canadian
attorney stating, "I regret that PMS is being taken seriously in legal systems anywhere, and
I hope it won't be imported into our courts." Gray, supra note 50, at 49.
'17 See supra notes 88-130 and accompanying text.
"I See Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d at 240-41, 559 P.2d at 559; Eber, supra note 12, at 917;
Woods, supra note 28, at 11.
119 See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
"10 See Walker, Thyfault & Brown, supra note 93, at 1; Note, supra note 31, at 213.
"I' See Note, supra note 31, at 219.
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mony on battered woman's syndrome indicates a concern that the
abused woman as a criminal defendant should receive fairer
treatment. 
1 2
The acceptability of defenses based on PMS, however, has
been hindered by various social and policy implications arising
from such acceptance. 63 Defenses based on PMS have been criti-
cized by many women as a retreat from equitable treatment.'64
Critics fear that the public will perceive all women as suffering
from disorders related to menstruation, and will therefore attempt
to keep women out of positions of authority and control.6 5 Some
feminists, because of the possible deleterious effects that would re-
sult from the acceptance of PMS evidence, deny the very existence
of the syndrome. 6 6 However, by limiting the availability of de-
fenses based on PMS to only those women most severely affected
by the disorder, and by requiring a thorough and accurate diagno-
sis of the defendant as a chronic sufferer, the concerns raised by
these feminists can be dispelled. 6 7 In the interest of fairness and
162 See State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. at 225-26, 478 A.2d at 388 (Handler, J., concurring).
Expert opinions and literature increasingly have recognized battered woman's syndrome as
both a contributing cause and a devastating consequence of domestic and familial violence.
Id.; see State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
161 See infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
' See Brozan, supra note 17, at C16, col. 2; Press & Clausen, Not Guilty Because of
PMS?, 100 NEWSWEEK 111, 111 (November 8, 1982); Note, supra note 16, at 227. Concern
has been raised that PMS and the theory that women can be biologically exculpated for
their actions will be used to discriminate against women. Press & Clausen, supra, at 111.
For years, the menstrual cycle has been a basis for sexual discrimination. Note, supra note
16, at 226. Some women's rights groups warn, therefore, that women must be wary of any
theory fueling the public perception that women go crazy every month. Id.
16 See Brozan, supra note 17, at C16, col. 2. PMS may possibly be asserted as a basis
for denying women child custody. See Angier & Witzelben, Dr. Jekyll & Ms. Hyde, 122
READER's DIGEST 119, 123 (Feb. 1983). In In re H., a British woman was prevented from
regaining custody of her child because she suffered from PMS. [Jan. 31, 1983] AA 77 of 1981
(Civ. App. 4) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). But see Tingen v. Tingen,
251 Or. 458, 460-61, 446 P.2d 185, 186-87 (1968) (mother diagnosed as having PMS awarded
custody of child).
166 See Chambers, supra note 54, at 46, col. 5; Bird, supra note 14, at B4, col. 4; Tran-
script of MacNeil-Lehrer Report at 5 (Dec. 23, 1983) (interview with Barbara Newman,
Brooklyn ADA on Santos case). Elizabeth Holtzman, the Brooklyn district attorney, was
quoted as saying that there is no scientific evidence proving the existence of a syndrome
that causes women to become insane or violent in connection with their menstrual periods.
Bird, supra note 14, at B4, col. 4.
167 See Tybor, supra note 60, at 17, col. 5. Dr. Katharina Dalton, who has testified in
several British trials involving PMS sufferers, requires detailed charting of a woman's men-
strual cycle and a diary of symptoms and behavior experienced over time by the defendant
before testifying for her. See id. It is suggested that a certification process similar to Dr.
Dalton's could be used to limit the availability of the PMS defense to only those defendants
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substantial justice, PMS sufferers should be entitled to enter as
evidence information regarding the special physical, psychological,
and behavioral characteristics that may relieve them of criminal
responsibility, regardless of the serious policy concerns asserted by
certain women's rights groups.16 8
CONCLUSION
Scientific research on both PMS and battered woman's syn-
drome is of keen interest to the legal community because of the
ramifications of these theories on the criminal liability of the suf-
ferers of both syndromes. Novel scientific theories, however, are
entitled to recognition in criminal law only if they are relevant to
underlying legal principles and are grounded adequately in scien-
tific fact. This Note has suggested, through a comparison of PMS
and battered woman's syndrome, that each of these theories has
satisfied the two prerequisites of legal recognition. Only conflicting
social implications arising from these theories can be offered as a
justification for their disparate legal treatment. Such social impli-
cations, however, place speculative and attenuated social concerns
above the right of the individual defendant to a fair trial. Since it
has been suggested that these theories can be used to minimize
their societal impact, it would be unjust to deny a defendant a fair
trial and substantial justice because of an unfounded fear that the
basis of her relief from criminal liability could possibly harm
broader social interests.
Joann D'Emilio
properly entitled to its use.
168 See Wallach & Rubin, supra note 13, at 238. The benefits available to the group of
women who might be able to raise a defense based on PMS must be weighed against the
potential setback to the women's movement caused by the possible perception that all
women are violent and irrational during the premenstrual phase. Note, supra note 16, at
227.
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